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he performance of the US economy in the seven full years 
of the Clinton Presidency is widely regarded as having been 
an extraordinary success. There is no doubt that dramatic 
departures from past US economic trends have occurred 
under Clinton. Three, in particular, stand out: the attainment of bal-
ance, and then a surplus, in the Federal budget; the simultaneous 
declines in unemployment and inﬂ   ation, in direct contradiction to 
the predictions of mainstream economic theory; and the historically 
unprecedented stock market boom.1 The Clinton Administration and its 
supporters present these as the fruit of a new direction in economic 
policy—what Clinton himself terms a ‘Third Way’ between ‘those who 
said government was the enemy and those who said government was 
the solution’—an ‘information-age government’ that ‘must be smaller, 
must be less bureaucratic, must be ﬁ  scally disciplined, and focused on 
being a catalyst for new ideas.’2
Clintonites are not, of course, the only political force to boast of the dis-
covery of a ‘Third Way’ between the legacy of Reagan and Thatcher and 
that of traditional social democracy (or what used to be termed ‘liber-
alism’ in the United States). Over the past ﬁ  ve years, regimes ranging 
from those of Blair in Britain to Cardoso in Brazil have invoked the 
same slogan. But if its main theoretical development has come from 
the UK, in the work of Anthony Giddens, it is the practical record 
of the US economy that is often held to offer the best evidence that 
there is substance to the claims for the Third Way. The reality of eco-
nomic policies and performance under Clinton has been very different 
from this ideological image. In most respects, it has represented a 
conventional centre-right agenda, akin—as Clinton himself once put 
it—to an ‘Eisenhower Republican’ stance updated to the post-Cold 
War epoch.3 Clinton’s Administration has essentially been deﬁ  ned by 18     nlr 3
across-the-board reductions in government spending, virtually unquali-
ﬁ  ed enthusiasm for free trade, deregulation of ﬁ  nancial markets, and 
only tepid, inconsistent efforts to regulate labour markets. 
The performance of the American economy under Clinton has also been 
far more mixed than is acknowledged by boosters of his ‘Third Way’. 
GDP growth and productivity gains have not exceeded the performance 
of previous presidential eras, even after ofﬁ  cial statisticians have revised 
national accounts upwards to reﬂ  ect putative contributions to growth by 
computer technology, and genuine acceleration since 1996. Moreover, 
while unemployment and inﬂ  ation have both fallen, the drop has been 
in large measure due to the declining ability of workers to secure wage 
increases even in persistently tight labour markets. Finally, the real eco-
nomic gains of the period have rested on a fragile foundation—a stock 
market in which prices have exploded beyond any previous historical 
experience, inducing an enormous expansion of private expenditure 
on consumption. But because household incomes have not risen to 
anywhere near as far as ﬁ   nancial asset values, the result has been 
unprecedented borrowing to pay for the spending spree. The springs 
of economic growth under Clinton have come from a levitating stock 
market setting off a debt-ﬁ  nanced private consumption boom.
In referring thus far to the policies and agenda of the Clinton 
Administration, I have written as if these had emerged fully formed from 
the President’s head or the briefs of his advisors. In fact, of course, the 
initiatives implemented, or even merely ﬂ  oated, under Clinton were also 
shaped by Wall Street, Congress and a host of other forces that converge 
in the lobbying vortex at Washington. To use Margaret’s Thatcher’s 
terms, Clinton is an archetypal ‘consensus’ rather than ‘conviction’ poli-
tician. As such, the policies he has enacted reﬂ  ect a general consensus 
inside the Washington Beltway more than particular convictions of his 
own, such as they may be, or of anyone else. But clearly, as head of 
the Executive, Clinton bears ultimate responsibility for them—one, of 
course, he eagerly claims as a ‘New Democrat’. 
1 I would like to thank Armagan Gezici and Josh Mason for their excellent research 
assistance and Jerry Epstein and Andrew Glyn for their constructive comments. 
2 See Clinton’s address on Social Security, 9 February 1998, on the White House 
website. 
3 See Bob Woodward, The Agenda, New York 1994, p. 165.pollin:  Clintonomics     19
i. economic policy under clinton
Trade policy
The Clinton Administration’s position on trade has been virtually iden-
tical to that of its Republican predecessors, proclaiming the universal 
virtues of free trade and pushing for Presidential authority to negotiate 
so-called ‘fast track’ agreements to further it, by-passing normal leg-
islative scrutiny. Gestures towards labour or environmental concerns 
have been almost completely empty of content—the sound-bite sop 
to demonst  rators at Seattle is a good example.4 The regime’s actual 
position on trade is set out at length in the Economic Report of 
the President (ERP) for 1998, which under the rubric of ‘Beneﬁ  ts of 
Market Opening’, rehearses the standard neo-classical case for free 
trade—i.e. the Hecksher–Ohlin argument for efﬁ  ciency gains through 
specialization, especially as economies of scale enhance productivity. 
Unsurprisingly, longstanding critiques of the assumptions behind the 
Hecksher–Ohlin model—in particular, its premisses of full employment 
and comparable technologies among trading partners—are ignored. 
Without these assumptions, it does not follow even from the orthodox 
model itself that all countries will necessarily beneﬁ  t from trade opening, 
since liberalization can, for example, trigger a rise in unemployment.5 
However, even if one accepts the assumptions, it is still well-known that 
trade opening produces losers as well as gainers. The Hecksher–Ohlin 
model itself stipulates a tendency toward factor price equalization among 
new commercial partners, which implies that when trade opens between 
a high and low wage country (for example, the US and Mexico), down-
ward wage pressure will be felt among the workers in the high-wage 
economy. Within this framework, it has therefore long been understood 
that for trade to be equitable as well as efﬁ  cient, even by minimal Pareto 
standards, losers from liberalization need to be recognized and compen-
sated for their losses.
4 According to Steven Greenhouse and Joseph Kahn of the New York Times, 3 
December 1999, Clinton’s interview with the Seattle Post-Intelligencer, in which 
he suggested that the WTO might employ sanctions to enforce core labour rights 
around the world, ‘stunned the delegates, and even his own negotiators’.
5 See the interesting discussion of these issues as they apply to NAFTA by Meheree 
Larudee, ‘Integration and Income Distribution under the North American Free 
Trade Agreement: the Experience in Mexico’, in Dean Baker, Gerald Epstein and 
Robert Pollin, eds, Globalization and Progressive Economic Policy, Cambridge 1998.20     nlr 3
If it is difﬁ  cult to estimate the precise impact of NAFTA, or any other 
single trade agreement, on the work and wages of average workers in the 
US, another question can be dependably answered. Rhetorical ﬂ  ourishes 
aside, the Clinton Administration has offered virtually no compensa-
tion to workers whose incomes and/or job security have been hurt by its 
trade policies.6 Rather, the 1998 ERP reiterates mainstream arguments 
that trade is not primarily responsible for either the long-run wage stag-
nation for most American workers or the increased differentials between 
high- and low-wage workers. Rising inequality in the labour-force it 
attributes, instead, to ‘skill-biased technological change’, as the introduc-
tion of new, computer-based processes creates wage premia for workers 
able to handle them while depressing the income of workers unable 
to do so. David Howell has demonstrated fundamental ﬂ  aws in this 
view, showing that increased wage inequality is actually more a reﬂ  ec-
tion of social and institutional, rather than technological, changes—-in 
particular, the steady weakening of American trade unions and growing 
hostility of American labour laws to the concerns of working people.7 
It follows that even if the Clinton Administration has failed to address 
losses to US workers from its trade policies, it could still have compen-
sated them with labour market policies and measures to redistribute 
income. What has been its record in these areas?
Labour policy
The short answer is that the Clinton Administration has done virtually 
nothing to advance the interests of organized labour or working people 
more generally. As longtime labour journalist David Moberg has com-
mented, ‘Clinton has probably identiﬁ  ed less with organized labour 
than any Democratic President this century.’8 Of course, since the AFL–
CIO is a permanent electoral prop of any Democratic candidate to 
the Presidency, its concerns cannot be completely disregarded in the 
Republican manner. Clinton thus supported a two-step rise in the mini-
mum wage in 1996–97, from $4.25 to its current level of $5.15. But this 
6 The ERP for 1998 states that the Administration has ‘made signiﬁ  cant reform 
of the existing trade adjustment assistance programme a priority’; in reality, these 
programmes remain minimal.
7 David Howell, ‘Theory-Driven Facts and the Growth in Earnings Inequality’, 
Review of Radical Political Economics, Winter 1999, pp. 54–86.
8 Interview with Moberg by Josh Mason in November 1999.pollin:  Clintonomics     21
modest increment has done little to reverse the precipitous fall in the 
real value of the minimum wage. In 1996 the real value of the $4.25 
rate was more than 40 percent below its buying-power in 1968. At the 
new rate of $5.15, set in September 1997, the minimum wage is still over 
30 percent below its real value in 1968, even though the economy has 
become 50 percent more productive over the past thirty years.9
The Administration also claims the Family and Medical Leave Act of 
August 1993 as a major accomplishment. The law requires employers 
with 50 or more employees within a 75-mile area to offer 12 weeks 
of unpaid leave per year for employees who had worked at least 1,250 
hours within the past year, to be taken for health problems, the birth or 
adoption of a child or care for a family member. The exact boundaries 
of these grounds have been poorly deﬁ  ned, as also the conditions that 
employers—who may require that employees use up their sick and vaca-
tion days before taking advantage of the Act—may impose on them (can 
the leave be taken in blocks of a few hours, creating in effect a part-time 
job with full beneﬁ  ts, etc?). In the area of worker training, billed as a 
central plank of Clinton’s pledge to ‘Put People First’, the Workforce 
Investment Act of August 1998 has consolidated the 40-odd Federal 
training programmes, introduced vouchers for workers to pay for private 
training, and created a nationwide jobs data-base. 
Proposed in March 1993, but not passed, was a Striker Replacement Act 
that would have barred companies from permanently replacing strikers 
in disputes over working conditions (temporary replacements and strikes 
over pay were not to be affected), which eventually got fewer votes in 
the Senate than a similar bill under Bush. However, in perhaps the 
best example of the President’s gesture politics, in March 1995 Clinton 
signed an executive order barring Federal contracts of over $100,000 to 
companies which had permanently replaced striking workers. Initially 
the Senate threatened to block the directive, but in the end it desisted, 
perhaps persuaded by reported Administration arguments that virtually 
no major contractors would be affected. In February 1996 the order 
was struck down by the DC Circuit Court of Appeals, and the issue was 
dropped. During the year it was nominally in effect, not one contract was 
9 See Robert Pollin and Stephanie Luce, The Living Wage: Building a Fair Economy, 
New York 1998, for a discussion of the historical trends in the minimum wage.22     nlr 3
cancelled under the directive. On the other side of the ledger, Clinton 
did veto cuts in funding for the National Labor Relations Board and 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration, and a bill that would 
have effectively legalized company unions; and his appointments to the 
National Labor Relations Board, in particular Frederick Feinstein as 
general counsel, have been more favourable to trade-union leaderships 
than before. But the overall record of the Administration on labour 
issues is in any comparative sense remarkably thin, especially given its 
unqualiﬁ  ed support for free trade in face of labour opposition. The net 
impact of Clinton’s tenure can be seen from the fate of organized labour 
itself. Far from picking up after its long decline, union membership 
fell even further during the Clinton Presidency. In 1998 it stood at 13.9 
percent of the total work-force, nearly three percentage points below the 
16.8 percent to which it had dropped in 1988, Ronald Reagan’s last year 
in ofﬁ  ce.
Fiscal Policy
Clinton’s tax policies, lessening the highly regressive impact of the 
Reagan–Bush years, constitute the principal item in the Administration’s 
claims to represent an enlightened alternative to the Republican rule 
of the eighties. The omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, which 
raised taxes by $240.4 billion over 5 years, increased the levy on incomes 
over $140,000 from 30 to 36 percent, with an additional 10 percent sur-
charge for incomes over $250,000. It also included a higher gasoline 
tax, a greater cap on income subject to Medicare hospital insurance tax, 
and a substantial extension of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), or 
direct income supplements to low-wage earners. Clinton’s second major 
piece of legislation was the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, which reduced 
taxes by $290 billion over 10 years—that is, reducing by half the rev-
enue gains scheduled in the 1993 Act. The new law combined a range 
of child and education tax credits with lower taxes on inheritance and 
capital gains. Calculations by the Citizens for Tax Justice estimate that 
the net effect of the 1997 Act has been to cut taxes for the top 60 percent 
of the population, with the great bulk of the hand-out going to the top 20 
percent.
Mishel, Bernstein and Schmitt have compared the total impact of the 
Clinton programme with the Reagan record by analysing the Federal tax 
rates of households at 1998 income levels, under the tax laws that pre-pollin:  Clintonomics     23
vailed in various years between 1977–98. Table 1 summarizes their main 
ﬁ  ndings.
As the table shows, between 1977–89, the bottom 80 percent of house-
holds experienced a slight increase of 0.5 percent in their tax obligations 
between 1977–89, and a somewhat bigger decline in these of 1.6 percent 
between 1989–98. Most of the tax reductions were concentrated among 
the least well-off 20 percent of households, who experienced a 4.6 per-
cent decline in their ﬁ  scal burden—a drop primarily due to changes in 
the Earned Income Tax Credit. Correspondingly, the richest 20 percent 
of households experienced a small decline in their tax rates of 1.3 percent 
between 1977–89, which was reversed between 1989–98 when their 
rates rose by 1.4 percent. Here, by far the biggest swing was among the 
top 1 percent, who experienced a 13.4 percent tax cut between 1977–89 
Table 1  Estimated effective Federal tax rates on
  1998 income under prevailing tax law
Bottom four-ﬁ  fths  +0.5 -1.6
Bottom 20 pct.  +0.2 -4.6
21-40 pct.  +1.3 -1.8
41-60 pct.  +0.4 -0.3
61-80 pct.  0.0 +0.4
Top ﬁ  fth  -0.3 +1.4
81-95 pct.  -0.3 +0.6
96-99 pct.  -1.9 +2.8
Top 1 pct.  -13.4 +7.7
All  +0.1 -1.0
Source: Mishel, Bernstein and Schmitt (1998)
Income group Percentage-point change
1977–89 1989–9824     nlr 3
and a 7.7 percent tax increase in the period 1989–98. Thus the Clinton 
Administration did restore part of the progressive dimension of the tax 
system that was lost in the 1980s, but not all of it.
What is not clear from the table is the extent to which the stock market 
boom, and consequent rise in revenues from Capital Gains Tax, helped 
to swell government coffers and allow a balanced budget by 1997. 
Between 1992–97, revenues from capital gains rose from $126.7 to $362 
billion—jumping from 2.7 to 5.0 percent of Treasury receipts. This is 
just one indicator of the extent to which Clinton’s economic record has 
depended on the fortunes of Wall Street, a topic we consider in more 
detail below.
Expenditure policy
The over-riding objective of the Clinton Administration has been to 
bring government expenditures down, in line with its broader macroeco-
nomic priority of deﬁ  cit reduction. The extent of the spending cuts is 
set out in Table 2, which shows Federal Government expenditure pat-
terns from 1992, the last year of the Bush Administration, until 1999. 
Between 1992–99, total Federal expenditures fell as a percentage of 
GDP from 21.9 to 18.6 percent, a decline of 14.9 percent. The most 
signiﬁ  cant reduction slashed military spending from 4.7 to 3.0 percent 
of GDP between 1992–99, in absolute terms a drop of 36.7 percent. 
But there have been large cuts in other areas as well, including support 
for education (-9.2 percent), science (-19.1 percent), transportation (-11.2 
percent) and income security (-16.0 percent). 
The cuts in military spending, of course, reﬂ  ect the end of the Cold 
War and consequent expectation of a widespread ‘peace dividend’. While 
they have been substantial, what is more remarkable is that the annual 
military budget should have remained at $300 billion, after the justiﬁ  ca-
tion for the exorbitant arms race of the Cold War period has evaporated. 
Spending on arms remains 4.6 times greater than Federal outlays on 
education. It is also triple the size of the military budget of the 1930s as 
a proportion of GDP—the last decade before the World War and Cold 
War, when GDP itself was historically low. The fact is that in so far as the 
end of the Cold War has yielded a peace dividend, it has taken the form 
of an overall decrease in the size of the Federal Government rather than 
an increase in Federal support for any of the programmes supposedly pollin:  Clintonomics     25
cherished by Clinton, such as better education, improved worker train-
ing, or alleviation of poverty.
The Administration’s extension of the Earned Income Tax Credit has 
been its most signiﬁ  cant anti-poverty initiative. The EITC originated 
under Ford’s Republican Administration in 1975, when it covered 6.2 
million families for an average credit (in 1998 dollars) of $609 per 
family. The programme expanded under Carter, Reagan and Bush 
alike (1978, 1984, 1986, 1990). By 1992, the last year of the Bush 
Administration, it covered 14.1 million families, who received an average 
credit of $1,076 (in 1998 dollars). By 1997 Clinton’s add-on had extended 
it to an estimated 19.5 million families for an average credit of nearly 
$1,600. Against this enlargement must be set the dismantling of wel-
fare assistance programmes—what had been called Aid to Families with 
Total Expenditures  21.87 18.62   -14.9
Defense  4.72 2.99  -36.7
International  0.25 0.16  -36.1
Science  0.25 0.20  -19.1
Natural Resources  0.32 0.26  -18.3
Agriculture  0.24 0.23 -4.6
Transportation  0.52 0.46  -11.2
Education  0.71 0.65 -9.2
Health  1.41 1.54  9.4
Medicare  1.88 2.21 17.3
Income Security  3.12 2.62  -16.0
Social Security  4.56 4.24 -7.0
Veterans  0.54 0.47  -11.8
Justice  0.22 0.26 16.8






Table 2  Federal expenditures by function 1992–99
Source: OMB, Budget of the United States, Historical Tables26     nlr 3
Dependent Children (AFDC), and is now termed Temporary Assistance 
for Needy Families (TANF). Thus, while outlays for EITC rose (in 1998 
dollars) by $14.7 billion, from $8.5 to $23.2 billion between 1992–98, 
spending on ‘family support’ fell by $2 billion, from $17.5 to $15.5 bil-
lion. This was not the only area of welfare to contract under Clinton. 
Expenditure on food stamps and other nutritional assistance dropped 
by $4.3 billion, from $37.8 to $33.5 billion between 1992–98—a decline 
reﬂ  ecting an increase in the percentage of households who are not 
receiving food assistance even though their income level is low enough 
to qualify them to receive it. Between 1995–97, the decline in the 
number of people receiving food stamps—4.4 million—was ﬁ  ve times 
greater than the decline in the number of people living in poverty, and 
was accompanied by a dramatic increase in the pressure on private soup 
kitchens and food pantries.
While the full reasons for the fall in public food assistance under Clinton 
are not entirely clear, it appears that the primary factor has been his 
campaign to ‘end welfare as we know it’. The ofﬁ  cial attack on depend-
ency has led both to greater stigma in receiving public assistance, and to 
greater difﬁ  culties in securing food stamps. When the pre-Clinton wel-
fare system was still functioning, a high proportion of recipients took 
their food stamps and cash assistance at the same time.10 The result 
of Clinton’s policies has been a complete standstill of expenditure on 
all public and food assistance programmes as a proportion of GDP, 
which remained at 1.3 percent in both 1992 and 1998. Clinton’s defend-
ers, of course, would reply that the Administration has replaced a bad 
programme—welfare—with a good one, because the EITC creates incen-
tives for work and does not discourage parents from living as a family 
unit. But if the EITC does correct some of the failings of the older welfare 
system, it also creates new and no less serious ones. Moving poor and 
unskilled women from welfare onto the labour market exerts downward 
pressure on wages, and the minimum wage itself is still too low to allow 
even a full-time worker to keep just herself and only one child above 
the ofﬁ  cial poverty line. A woman in this position will receive EITC to 
supplement her income, but she will also now have to pay for childcare 
10 For discussion of the declining use of food stamps, see Sharon Parrott and Stacy 
Dean, ‘Food stamps can help low-income families put food on the table’, Centre on 
Budget and Policy Priorities (website), Washington DC 1999; and Andrew Revkin, 
‘A plunge in use of food stamps causes concern’, New York Times 25 February 99. pollin:  Clintonomics     27
and get less support from food assistance programmes. Structurally, 
the interactive effects of a low minimum wage and widened EITC have 
allowed business to continue to offer rock-bottom wages, while shifting 
onto taxpayers the cost of alleviating the poverty of even those holding 
full-time jobs. In sum, the Clinton Administration’s anti-poverty pro-
grammes have not increased income transfers to the poor as a share 
of GDP. After allowing for the increased costs of childcare, the overall 
conditions of life for America’s most destitute households may have 
worsened during the Clinton Administration. 
Macroeconomic and regulatory policies
Throughout, the over-riding economic objective of Clinton’s Presidency 
has been deﬁ  cit reduction. At its outset, the Administration adopted the 
doctrine that stringent control of Federal expenditure was a condition 
of lowering interest rates, which alone could stimulate private-sector 
investment and therewith overall growth. We have seen the pattern of 
spending cuts to which this commitment has led. Even after a balanced 
budget was attained in 1997, Clinton pressed on—now with the aim of 
reducing and even eliminating outstanding Federal debt. Concomitantly, 
monetary policy has been loosened, as Greenspan at the Federal Reserve 
has tolerated lower rates of unemployment than Volcker, while remain-
ing vigilant against upward wage pressures. Nevertheless, interest rates 
have remained well above historical levels. 
Financial markets, meanwhile, have been been treated with a more gen-
erous hand than labour markets. The Federal Reserve and the Treasury 
organized lavish bail-outs for investors in the Mexican, East Asian and 
Long-Term Capital Management crises—interventions that succeeded 
in preventing any cascading collapse in private credit markets, and pro-
tecting the interests of major wealth-holders. By validating speculative 
operations that would otherwise have ended in disaster, these bail-outs 
have, of course, been primers in ‘moral hazard’, setting the stage for 
further excesses that could trigger more severe crises later on. But this 
liberality is consistent with its approach to ﬁ  nancial regulation at large. 
For the other major landmark of the Clinton Administration has been 
repeal of the Glass–Steagall legacy of the Depression years. The barri-
ers Glass–Steagall set up between commercial and investment banking, 
and its obstruction of banking across state lines, were in practice no 
longer effective instruments of ﬁ   nancial stability, or of widespread 28     nlr 3
access to credit, under conditions of global integration. But no attempt 
was made by the Clinton Administration to seek more contemporary 
means of securing the stabilizing and redistributive ends Glass–Steagall 
had aimed at, such as a combination of taxes on speculative transactions 
and lower reserve requirements on loans for productive investments.11 
Quite the contrary. Emblematically, Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin, 
after orchestrating the elimination of Glass–Steagall, was among the 
ﬁ  rst to beneﬁ  t personally from it, moving from Washington to become 
Co-Chairman of the newly merged banking conglomerate Citigroup—a 
fusion of the former commercial bank Citicorp and the former invest-
ment house Travelers that would never have been permitted under any 
reasonable interpretation of Glass-Steagall. In short, by both deregulat-
ing ﬁ  nancial markets and diminishing the supply of low-risk Treasury 
securities,12 the Clinton administration has done much to encourage 
speculative over-drive. 
ii. economic performance under clinton
Economic performance in the United States under the Clinton 
Administration has been widely hailed as an unqualiﬁ  ed success.13 But 
looking at some basic indicators in a comparative historical perspective, 
presented in Tables 3–6 below, we observe a much more mixed per-
formance. There have been some signiﬁ  cant departures from historic 
trends. But, given the centre-right direction of policy under Clinton, it 
should not be surprising that their beneﬁ  ts have been skewed toward 
the wealthy. Moreover, virtually all the economic achievements of the 
Clinton years have been tied to the extraordinary performance of the 
stock market, which has concurrently generated a highly fragile ﬁ  nan-
cial structure.
11 For such solutions, see Robert Pollin, ‘Financial Structures and Egalitarian 
Economic Policy’, NLR (I) 214, November–December 1995, pp. 36–61.
12 These are unique instruments because they are free of default risk—though still, 
of course, subject to market risk, especially in an inﬂ  ationary environment. 
13 The Wall Street Journal, for example, announced on the occasion of Clinton’s 
renomination of Greenspan as Chairman of the Federal Reserve: ‘The US economy 
is enjoying its best performance in more than a generation with low unemploy-
ment and low inﬂ  ation. If the current expansion lasts through February, something 
generally expected, it will surpass the 1960s as the longest period of uninterrupted 
economic growth in US history’: 4 January 2000. pollin:  Clintonomics     29
Table 3  Macro Performance Indicators
Table 3 presents some basic macro statistics—GDP growth, produc-
tivity, unemployment and inﬂ  ation. In the upper panel of the table, 
the data are grouped by presidential eras—I have combined Kennedy–
Johnson, Nixon–Ford and Reagan–Bush, as well as showing the Carter 
and Clinton years separately. In the lower panel, I group the same data 
according to NBER business cycles, as a check on the reliability of presi-
dential eras as a measure of economic trends.14
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These indicators make it clear that, at least through 1999, the Clinton 
years have not been unusually successful in historical terms. Most strik-
ingly, the Clinton period has not approached the macro performance of 
the Kennedy/Johnson era, when both GDP (4.8 vs. 3.7 percent) and pro-
ductivity growth (3.4 vs. 1.8 percent) increased much more rapidly, while 
average unemployment (4.8 vs. 5.6 percent) was substantially lower. The 
ﬁ  gures for Clinton will improve when 2000 is included in these aggre-
gates. Nevertheless, even allowing for an additional strong year, the 
Clinton performance will not match that of the Kennedy/Johnson era 
in GDP growth, productivity or unemployment. On the other hand, the 
rate of inﬂ  ation under Clinton has been kept down to the lowest range 
level of the Kennedy/Johnson years, and declined over time, whereas 
inﬂ  ation took off towards the end of Johnson’s Presidency as costs of the 
war in Vietnam escalated. Of course, a decline in inﬂ  ation in itself does 
not tell us much about who gains or loses from it—it might indicate 
slack labour markets of no beneﬁ  t to wage-earners.
Judged by less stringent standards than the 1960s, however, the macro-
economic record of the Clinton years compares favourably with that of 
Nixon/Ford, Carter and Reagan/Bush. GDP growth was higher and both 
unemployment and inﬂ  ation were lower. Productivity growth was still 
slow, even relative to the Nixon/Ford years. But the overall performance 
of the American economy has been stronger, if not to a dramatic degree. 
Clinton’s tenure, of course, has been graced by the circumstance that no 
recession has occurred during his Presidency.15 If we consider the rela-
tive performance of the economy in the full business cycle of 1991–98 as 
against its predecessors, the 1990s do not stand out relative to either the 
1970s or the 1980–90 cycle, and do still worse relative to the 1960–69 
cycle. In short, it is hard to make a serious case that the US economy 
14 The cyclical data are organized on a peak-to-peak basis, through reference dates 
established by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). I have derived 
yearly peak dates from the NBER monthly peaks. When the NBER peak month falls 
between January and September of a given year, that year becomes the cyclical peak 
year; otherwise it is the following year. In addition, I have merged two sets of cycles 
into a single cycle—those for 1970–73/1974–79 and 1980–81/1982–90.
15 On a more technical note, revisions in the methods used for measuring inﬂ  ation 
and investment have also made the Clinton record look better. For a discussion 
of the problems and potential biases in the new statistics, see Dean Baker, 
‘What’s New in the Nineties’, typescript, Centre for Economic and Policy Analysis, 
Washington DC 1999. pollin:  Clintonomics     31
in the 1990s has been unusually robust once we take account of the 
1990–91 recession. Of course, supporters of Clinton would claim that 
his ability to avoid a recession since 1993 has been a major accomplish-
ment in itself.
Changing composition of GDP 
Further perspective on the macroeconomic record of the Clinton years 
is offered by Table 4, showing the breakdown of GDP into component 
expenditure categories—consumption, government, investment and net 
exports. Two sets of ﬁ  gures stand out here. The ﬁ  rst we have already 
noted: there has been a drastic contraction of government spending, 
which at 18.2 percent of GDP is far below that of any previous presiden-
tial period. What we also see in Table 4 is that the slack created by the fall 
Table 4  Components of GDP (in percentages)
A.   Performance by Presidential Terms
 1961–68  1969–76  1977–80  1981–92  1993–99
 Kennedy–  Nixon–  Carter  Reagan–  Clinton
 Johnson  Ford    Bush 
Consumption  61.7 62.2 62.6 64.9  67.0
Government  22.4 21.9 20.0 20.6  18.2
Investment  15.5 15.9 18.2 16.1  16.3
Net Exports  0.4 -0.05  -0.9 -1.6  -1.5
B.   Performance by NBER Business Cycle Averages
 1960–69  1970–79  1980–90  1991–99
Consumption  61.8 62.4 64.4 66.9
Government  22.4 21.2 20.6 18.7
Investment  15.5 16.7 16.7 15.7
Net Exports  0.3 -0.3 -1.7 -1.3
Sources: National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA); Economagic web page.
Notes: In the B panel, NBER cycles are grouped on a peak-to-peak basis. For brevity, two sets of cycles—
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in public expenditure has been taken up by rocketing private consump-
tion, which at 67 percent of GDP is more than ﬁ  ve percentage points 
higher than during the Kennedy/Johnson boom. It is clear from these 
ﬁ  gures that it is the rise in consumer spending that has been the driving 
force of aggregate demand under Clinton, allowing government expend-
iture to fall without generating a slowdown in overall growth. Thus, to 
understand what has sustained growth in these years, we need to look at 
the bases for the expansion of private consumption. A consideration of 
ﬁ  nancial market practices and performance in the Clinton period throws 
a good deal of light on this question.
Financial market behaviour
The most dramatic economic change of the Clinton presidency has 
been the transformation of the country’s ﬁ  nancial structure by the stock 
bubble and shifts associated with it. Table 5 provides some indication 
of what has been involved. During the Kennedy/Johnson and Reagan/
Bush periods, the Standard and Poor index of the stock prices of the 
top 500 companies in the economy rose at a rapid annual rate of 6.2 
percent. During the Nixon/Ford and Carter years, the S&P actually fell 
in real terms. Under Clinton, it has registered an annual growth rate of 
17.6 percent that has no historical precedent. 
The performance of the stock market under Clinton becomes even more 
astonishing when measured against GDP during the various presiden-
tial eras. In theory, ﬂ  uctuations in equity prices over a full business cycle 
are supposed to reﬂ  ect the underlying performance of the real economy. 
Thus, by measuring the difference between growth of the S&P 500 and 
GDP, we can observe the extent to which the stock market is respond-
ing to real economic developments. Here again, the Clinton experience 
is without precedent. Since 1993 the rise in stock prices has been 13.9 
percent above that of the real economy. Even in the Reagan and Bush 
years, during which economic policy overwhelmingly favoured the pre-
rogatives of capital, and ﬁ  nancial capital in particular, stock prices rose 
only 3.3 percent faster than GDP.
Table 5 also presents some data on changes in household ﬁ  nancial 
patterns during the Clinton boom. The third row of ﬁ  gures suggests 
the degree to which the consumption boom has been debt ﬁ  nanced. 
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eted upward dramatically during Clinton’s tenure, to reach 94.2 percent 
of disposable income. This compares with a ratio of 77.8 percent during 
the Reagan/Bush years, itself an unprecedented level compared with 
any previous period. The next column, showing household debt relative 
to total ﬁ  nancial assets, indicates how this expansion of debt has been 
collateralized—by a rise in asset values rather than incomes. Thus, we 
see that the liability/asset ratio of American households has not risen at 
all during the Clinton Presidency, even while the debt/income ratio was 
shooting up. But the composition of household assets has changed mark-
edly. Traditionally, American property-owners have maintained a steady 
Table 5  Financial market indicators
A.   Performance by Presidential Terms
 1961–68  1969–76  1977–80  1981–92  1993–99
 Kennedy–  Nixon–  Carter  Reagan–  Clinton
 Johnson  Ford    Bush 
S & P 500 real
average annual  6.2 -3.6 -2.8  6.2 17.6
growth rate (%)
S & P 500 real








liabilities / ﬁ  n-  17.1 19.1 22.2 23.0  21.8
ancial assets (%)
Household bank
deposits + govt.  25.1 25.4 26.6 26.0  17.8
securities / total
ﬁ  nancial assets (%)
Real Interest Rate
(10-year Treasury  2.2 0.6 -1.2 5.5  3.7
bond CPI rate)
Sources: National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA); Economagic web page.34     nlr 3
share of their holdings in insured bank deposits and non-defaultable 
Treasury securities—prior to the Clinton period, somewhere between 
25–27 percent. Under Clinton, this ‘safe asset’ proportion has fallen to 
17.8 percent, a stark departure from previous patterns.16
Finally Table 5 reports ﬁ  gures on real interest rates for 10-year Treasury 
bonds. It shows that rates did fall in the Clinton period relative to 
Reagan/Bush years, from an average of 5.5 to 3.7 percent. But the 3.7 
percent rate under Clinton is still far higher than the level of any previ-
ous presidential era. Indeed, for the whole post-war period 1947–79, the 
average real Treasury rate was 1.2 percent, less than a third of its level 
Table 5  Financial market indicators (continued)
B.   Performance by NBER Business Cycle Averages
 1960–69  1970–79  1980–90  1991–99
S & P 500 real
average annual  2.9 -3.5  5.7 15.9
growth rate (%)
S & P 500 real








liabilities / ﬁ  n-  17.0 20.2 22.7  22.2
ancial assets (%)
Household bank
deposits + govt.  23.2 26.1 26.6  18.5
securities / total
ﬁ  nancial assets (%)
Real Interest Rate
(10-year Treasury  2.1 0.0 5.1  3.9
bond CPI rate)
Note: In the B panel, NBER cycles are grouped on a peak-to-peak basis. For brevity, two sets of cycles—
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in the Clinton period.17 These ﬁ  gures make it difﬁ  cult to argue that the 
sharp increase in household debt is a response to low interest rates. The 
reality is that these have been low only relative to the unprecedented 
peaks of the Reagan/Bush years: they are high by any other historical 
benchmark. The basic justiﬁ  cation given by the Clinton Administration 
for its drive to eliminate the Federal deﬁ  cit was that this alone could 
cut interest rates dramatically, by reducing aggregate demand for credit 
and enabling the Federal Reserve to pursue a looser monetary policy. In 
practice, however, rates have fallen relative to the Reagan/Bush years, 
when Federal deﬁ  cits soared, but they remain historically high despite 
the attainment of ﬁ  scal balance. The claim that government deﬁ  cits 
alone have been responsible for high real interest rates since the 1980s 
clearly needs to be rethought.
Conditions for workers and the poor 
Finally, how have working people and the poor fared during Clinton’s 
Presidency? Table 6 suggests some measure of their fate. The results 
are highly unfavourable to Clinton. Despite the relatively strong macro 
performance—to say nothing of the stock-market boom—both the aver-
age wages for non-supervisory workers and the earnings of those in 
the lowest 10th percent decile of wage distribution not only remain 
well below those of the Nixon–Ford and Carter Administrations, but 
are actually lower even than those of the Reagan–Bush years. Moreover, 
wage inequality—as measured by the ratio of the 90th to 10th percent 
decile—has increased sharply during Clinton’s tenure in ofﬁ  ce, even 
relative to the Republican heyday of the eighties.
Nor has there been any signiﬁ  cant reduction in poverty under Clinton, 
even relative to the Reagan–Bush years. If low rates of unemployment 
have been a positive feature of the 1990s, it is still quite possible that 
the overall condition of the poor will prove to have worsened in Clinton’s 
ﬁ  nal years of ofﬁ  ce, as the dismantling of Federal welfare programmes 
16 Wynne Godley argues persuasively that these ﬁ  nancial patterns in the household 
sector cannot last. See Seven Unsustainable Processes: Medium-Term Prospects and 
Policies for the United States and the World, Levy Institute, Annandale 1999.
17 For the historical ﬁ  gures on interest rates, see Robert Pollin and Gary Dymski, 
‘The Costs and Beneﬁ  ts of Financial Instability: Big Government and the Minsky 
Paradox’, in Dymski and Pollin, eds, New Perspectives in Monetary Macroeconomics, 
Ann Arbour 1994, pp. 369–402.36     nlr 3
Table 6  Financial market indicators (continued)
B.   Performance by NBER Business Cycle Averages
 1960–69  1970–79  1980–90  1991–98
Average wage




10th percent decile  – $6.24  $5.73  $5.54
(in 1998 dollars)
Ratio of 90th/
10th percent   – 3.6  4.1  4.3
decile wages
Individual
poverty rate (%)  17.5 11.8 13.8 14.0
Table 6  Measures of well-being for workers and the poor
A.   Performance by Presidential Terms
 1961–68  1969–76  1977–80  1981–92  1993–98
 Kennedy–  Nixon–  Carter  Reagan–  Clinton
 Johnson  Ford    Bush 
Average wage




10th percent decile  – $6.14  $6.32  $5.68  $5.52
(in 1998 dollars)
Ratio of 90th/
10th percent   – 3.7  3.6  4.1  4.4
decile wages
Individual
poverty rate (%)  17.5 11.9 11.9 14.0  13.8
Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics; Mishel, Bernstein and Schmitt (1999).
Notes: Wage data for decile groupings begins in 1973. Because of some gaps in the available data for 
1999, all ﬁ  gures in the table end with 1998. In the B panel, NBER cycles are grouped on a peak-to-peak 
basis. For brevity, two sets of cycles—1970–73/1974–79 and 1980–81/1982–90—have been merged.pollin:  Clintonomics     37
proceeds. We do not observe any noticeably different patterns if the data 
are divided by business cycles rather than presidential periods. But we 
do know that the well-being of working and poor people alike declines 
during recessions, as unemployment rises and wages fall. This is why 
the ﬁ  gures for 1991–98, which include a recession, show lower wage 
rates and higher levels of poverty than during Clinton’s term of ofﬁ  ce. 
Had he presided over an interlude of recession, the record would have 
been even more severe.
iii. extraordinary developments under clinton
Still, whatever else may be said of macroeconomic performance under 
the Clinton Presidency, the simultaneous fall of unemployment and 
inﬂ  ation has deﬁ  ed the expectations of virtually all orthodox economists. 
In 1999, according to ofﬁ  cial ﬁ  gures, some 4.2 percent of the work-force 
were jobless, while inﬂ  ation was running at 2.4 percent—higher than the 
1.6 percent rate for 1998, but otherwise lower than all but two other years 
since 1965. Most economists, adhering to the Natural Unemployment/
Non-Accelerating Inﬂ  ation Rate of Unemployment doctrines dominant 
since the early 1970s, had long predicted that unemployment in the 
region of 4 percent must lead to headlong inﬂ  ation. They argued that 
policy-makers therefore had a duty to maintain unemployment at its 
NAIRU rate—that is, the level below which inﬂ  ation would take off. To 
this end, it was generally believed that unemployment needed to be per-
haps as high as 6 percent. 
What happened to the inﬂ  ation/unemployment trade-off?
What caused the dramatic shift in the trade-off between unemployment 
and inﬂ  ation, and to what extent has the Clinton Administration been 
responsible for it? Some leading economists have begun to concede that 
the NAIRU is subject to change over time. Robert Gordon, for one, 
has concluded from an extensive econometric analysis of the past two 
decades that NAIRU is ‘time-varying’—falling, for example, from 6.2 
percent in 1990 to 5.6 by mid-1996.18 Douglas Staiger, James Stock and 
18 Robert Gordon, ‘The Time-Varying NAIRU and its Implications for Economic 
Policy’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1997, 11:1, pp. 11–32.38     nlr 3
Mark Watson concur, ﬁ  nding that NAIRU in 1997 was between 5.5 and 
5.9 percent, a full percentage point below its level for the early 1980s. 
They also admit that ‘the most striking feature of these estimates is their 
lack of precision’.19 Their NAIRU estimate not only varies over time but 
also has the capacity to range widely at a given point in time.
The general thrust of these broad econometric ﬁ  ndings appears solid 
enough. Indeed, they are difﬁ  cult to dispute precisely because they are 
so broad. But in focusing exclusively on point estimates, conﬁ  dence 
intervals, and their variation over time, they miss the fundamental 
question that leaps out from these results—namely, what makes a 
‘time-varying’ NAIRU vary in the ﬁ   rst place? It is remarkable that 
leading economists who have devoted so much time to estimating 
values for NAIRU almost completely neglect this question. Occasionally, 
however, a few revealing hints are dropped as asides. Gordon, for 
example writes:
The two especially large changes in the NAIRU . . . are the increase between 
the early and late 1960s and the decrease in the 1990s. The late 1960s were 
a time of labor militancy, relatively strong unions, a relatively high mini-
mum wage and a marked increase in labor’s share in national income. The 
1990s have been a time of labor peace, relatively weak unions, a relatively 
low minimum wage and a slight decline in labor’s income share.20
Gordon also casually refers to intensiﬁ  ed world competition in product 
and labour markets, and increased ﬂ  ows of unskilled immigrant labour 
into the United States, as factors contributing to a declining NAIRU. 
Though again these observations are mere asides in Gordon’s paper, the 
overall point is clear: it is changes in the balance of forces between capi-
tal and labour, and the growing integration of the US into the global 
economy—which has made it more difﬁ  cult for US ﬁ  rms to raise prices 
and US workers to improve wages—that have been the main forces driv-
ing the NAIRU down. Gordon’s general hunch is fully consistent with 
the econometric results generated by Cara Lown and Robert Rich of the 
New York Federal Reserve Bank. They found that, between 1990 and 
1995, the stagnation of wages and beneﬁ  ts by itself fully explains the lack 
of inﬂ  ationary pressure at low levels of unemployment.21 Data for the 
19 Douglas Staiger, James Stock and Mark Watson, ‘The NAIRU, Unemployment 
and Monetary Policy’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1997, 11:1, pp. 33–50.
20 ‘The Time-Varying NAIRU’, p. 30.pollin:  Clintonomics     39
Lown and Rich study end in 1995. Since then, additional factors have 
contributed to dampening inﬂ  ation. For one, energy prices fell substan-
tially over 1997–98. In addition, the East Asian ﬁ  nancial crisis triggered 
currency devaluations throughout the region, making American imports 
cheaper. For their part, workers—especially in the computer industry—
have been increasingly willing to follow their employers in taking stock 
options as part of their total compensation package. That may also be 
reducing any upward wage pressure, though we should remember that 
only 21 percent of Americans own any equity outside their share of 
retirement funds. Finally, of course, we do indeed observe dramatic 
price increases in this business cycle, if at the stock exchange rather than 
the supermarket. 
The central fact remains, however, that wage gains during the Clinton 
boom have remained well below those of any other expansion, much 
less a period of near full employment. This underlying reality is captured 
in a Business Week report of December 1999 that substantial majorities 
of US citizens expressed acute dissatisfaction with various features of 
their economic situation. For example, 51 percent of American workers 
who were interviewed declared that they ‘felt cheated by their employer’. 
When asked their view of what Business Week termed the ‘current pro-
ductivity boom’, 63 percent said that the boom has not raised their 
earnings, and 62 percent that it had not improved their job security.22 
Such negative popular reactions are very striking, given the persistent 
portrayal by the media of the Clinton economy as a time of unpar-
alleled prosperity. Behind them lies the primary explanation for the 
collapse of the trade-off between unemployment and inﬂ  ation, openly 
acknowledged by Alan Greenspan in his regular semi-annual testimony 
to Congress in July 1997. Saluting the economy’s performance that year 
as ‘extraordinary’ and ‘exceptional’, he remarked that a major factor con-
tributing to its outstanding achievement was ‘a heightened sense of job 
insecurity and, as a consequence, subdued wages.’23 This ‘heightened 
sense of job insecurity’ lies at the very foundation of the Clinton admin-
istration’s economic legacy.
21 Cara Lown and Robert Rich, ‘Is there an Inﬂ  ation Puzzle?’ Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York Economic Policy Review, December 1997, pp. 51–69. 
22 See Business Week 27 December 1999.
23 Greenspan’s testimony can be found on the Federal Reserve site at www.bog.
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The stock market boom
The stock market bubble has been the other extraordinary development 
associated with the Clinton Presidency. What makes it extraordinary is 
the effect it has had outside Wall Street, on the American and world 
economy. Dean Baker has summed up its impact as follows:
The run-up in stock prices, in excess of GDP growth, has added more 
than $8 trillion in ﬁ  nancial wealth over the last nine years. A conventional 
rule of thumb is that $1 of stock wealth increases consumption by 3 cents. 
This calculation would imply that the $8 trillion of excessive stock market 
accumulation over the last nine years has increased consumption by $240 
billion compared with a situation where the stock market had only kept 
pace with GDP. This additional consumption corresponds almost exactly 
to the 4.5 percentage point drop in the saving rate that the economy has 
experienced during this period.24
The rise in debt-ﬁ  nanced consumption has, in turn, maintained a buoy-
ant level of aggregate demand in the US economy, despite the fact that 
government expenditures have declined and the trade deﬁ  cit has grown. 
At the same time, as we have seen, the Federal Government received 
nearly $50 billion more in revenue in 1997 relative to 1992 from capi-
tal gains taxes—by far the largest proportional increase from any ﬁ  scal 
source. Thus the stock market boom has been central both to the cre-
ation of a ﬁ   scal surplus under Clinton and—through wealth-driven 
increases in consumption—to counteraction of the negative effects of 
that surplus on aggregate demand. The boom has, moreover, enabled 
ﬁ  rms to meet pension fund obligations by rising portfolio values rather 
than transferring revenues into retirement funds. This in turn has 
released internal cash-ﬂ  ow for distribution as dividends to shareholders 
or investment in new capital. Rising share prices have also fuelled the 
pace of corporate mergers, by enabling ﬁ  rms to buy other companies 
through stock transfers rather than having either to borrow or pay cash.
Conventional explanations of the bubble give pride of place to the dra-
matic advances in computer and internet-related technology, which are 
held to have engendered formidable productivity gains. But we have seen 
that productivity has not registered exceptional growth under Clinton, 
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even after upward revision of national accounts to make special provi-
sion for computer-driven improvements. It is true that there has been 
a spurt to an annual average rate of 2.6 percent between 1996 and 
1999, as against the dismal 0.8 percent of 1993-95. But such productiv-
ity ﬁ  gures are hardly a sufﬁ  cient basis to underwrite the Clinton stock 
boom—at the much higher annual rate of productivity growth of 3.4 
percent in the Kennedy/Johnson period, nothing close to this specu-
lative spree occurred. Moreover, current research casts doubt on the 
magnitude of the recent spurt itself.25 Of course, the promise of future 
internet-led leaps in productivity remains. But even if we allow that pos-
sibility, it still does not explain the magnitude of the current stock price 
inﬂ  ation. As Doug Henwood notes:
The Internet stocks that have headlined the mania over the last year are 
without known precedent in US ﬁ  nancial history. At its highs in early April, 
the market capitalization of Priceline.com, which sells airline tickets on the 
web and has microscopic revenues, was twice that of United Airlines and 
just a hair under American’s. America Online was worth nearly as much 
as Disney and Time Warner combined, and more than GM and Ford com-
bined. Yahoo was capitalized a third higher than Boeing, and eBay nearly 
as much as CBS. At its peak, AOL sported a price/earnings ratio of 720, 
Yahoo! of 1,468 and eBay of 9,571 . . . Oh yes, enthusiasts respond, but 
these are bets on a grand future. But previous world-transformative events 
have never been capitalized like this . . . RCA peaked at a P/E of 73 in 1929. 
Xerox traded at a P/E of 123 in 1961. Apple maxed out at a P/E of 150 in 
1980. And all these companies were pretty quick to turn a proﬁ  t, and once 
they did, their growth rates were ripping. In the so-called Nifty Fifty era 
of the early 1970s, the half-hundred glamour stocks that led the market 
sported P/Es of forty to sixty . . . And those evaluations were once legendary 
for their extravagance.26
25 For example, Marcello Estevão and Saul Lach of the Federal Reserve argue that 
ofﬁ  cial ﬁ  gures for the manufacturing sector should be deﬂ  ated by 0.5 percent 
once the outsourcing of employment to temporary help agencies is taken into 
account. See ‘Measuring Temporary Labour Outsourcing in US Manufacturing’, 
NBER Working Paper 7421, October 1999. James Medoff of Harvard and his 
associate Andrew Harless suggest that activities related to the Y2K transition also 
greatly inﬂ  ated recent productivity ﬁ  gures. In a similar vein, Robert Gordon of 
Northwestern contends that since 1995 virtually all increases in productivity have 
occurred in the manufacturing of computer hardware. He claims that ‘there has 
been no productivity acceleration in the 99 per cent of the economy located outside’ 
this sector. For a summary of these views, see James Grant ‘Wired Ofﬁ  ce, Same 
Workers’, New York Times, 1 May 2000, p. A 27. 
26 ‘The United States’, Monthly Review, July 1999, p. 129.42     nlr 3
Causes of the bubble
Given the historically unique character of the bubble of the 1990s, it will 
be some time before we have a deﬁ  nitive account of its causes. But for 
the moment, and still to some extent groping in the dark, we may point 
to ﬁ  ve signiﬁ  cant factors:
1. Financial deregulation. Kindleberger and others have amply 
documented the way in which speculative manias have historically 
recurred in ﬁ  nancial markets.27 After the Wall Street Crash of 1929 
and the slump of the 1930s, post-war governments in all major 
capitalist economies set in place far-reaching systems of ﬁ  nancial 
regulation to prevent renewed bouts of destructive speculation. In 
consequence, for the ﬁ  rst 25 years after the end of World War II, stock 
markets were relatively tranquil. This experience suggests one simple 
explanation for the Clinton boom: that in the absence of effective 
regulation, speculative excess will inevitably occur in ﬁ  nancial 
markets, though exactly how bubbles will emerge and develop can 
never be known in advance. In this sense, asset inﬂ  ation has broken 
all bounds in the 1990s because the Clinton Administration has 
operated no adequate controls to inhibit its development. 
2.  Increased inequality and proﬁ  tability. As we have seen, the rewards 
of economic growth under Clinton have been claimed increasingly 
by the wealthy. Wages have continued to stagnate or decline for 
most workers, even as GDP and productivity growth have risen. With 
wages held down as output and productivity rise, proﬁ  ts inevitably 
increase. Under Clinton they have reached a thirty-year peak. In 
1997 the share of total corporate income accruing to proﬁ  ts was 
21.6 percent, as opposed to cyclical highs under Nixon (1973) of 18.0 
percent, Carter (1979) of 17.4 percent, and even Reagan (1989) of 
18.4 percent.28 The escalation of proﬁ  ts under the Clinton Presidency 
in turn feeds expectations of further increases in proﬁ  tability, in 
conditions where the political system continues to favour so heavily 
the interests of the rich, regardless of whether there are Democratic 
27 See especially Charles Kindleberger, Manias, Crashes and Panics: A History of 
Financial Crisis, New York 1977.
28 See Lawrence Mishel, Jared Bernstein and John Schmitt, The State of Working 
America 1998–1999, Ithaca 1999.pollin:  Clintonomics     43
or Republican incumbents in the White House. If Clinton’s tax 
policies are less regressive than Reagan’s, they are more so than 
Nixon’s, while in the areas of trade, ﬁ   nancial and even labour 
markets, the trend of his Administration has been strongly pro-
business.
3.  Changes in US wealth-holding patterns. We have seen the extent 
to which American households have moved their portfolios out of 
low-risk bank deposits and Treasury securities into riskier assets—
above all equities. The rise of mutual funds and derivative markets, 
through which the risks associated with stock-ownership are spread, 
has certainly contributed to this shift. But it also suggests that 
property-owners have come to believe that equities are now less 
of a hazard than they have been at any prior point in history.29 
The Clinton Administration alone is obviously not responsible for 
creating this state of mind among investors. In part, such thinking 
stems from the rise in proﬁ   tability and, especially, the positive 
feedback effects of favourable returns on investor expectations. Alan 
Greenspan himself has repeatedly tried to dampen such ‘irrational 
exuberance’ among wealth-holders. But the enthusiasm with which 
the Federal Reserve and the Clinton Administration have pushed for 
the deregulation of ﬁ  nancial markets has more than counterbalanced 
any downward jawboning efforts by Greenspan.30
4.  Shifts in foreign wealth-holding patterns. From 1989 onwards, the 
US has become a net debtor nation, as foreign-owned assets in 
the country have exceeded American-owned assets abroad. Through 
the 1990s, foreign wealth-holders have increasingly purchased 
dollar-denominated assets in US ﬁ  nancial markets. By the end of 
1998, the magnitude of the foreign debt had reached $1.5 trillion, 
29 Recent business-book titles giving graphic expression of this state of mind 
include Dow 36,000 by James Glassman and Kevin Hassert; Dow 40,000: Strategies 
for Proﬁ  ting from the Greatest Bull Market in History by David Elias, and, not to be 
outdone, Dow 100,000: Fact or Fiction by Charles Kadlec and Ralph Acampora.
30 Robert Rubin, of course, was an unequivocal champion of ﬁ  nancial deregulation 
while at the Treasury. Current Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers is no less 
fervent a promoter of deregulation, even though as an academic economist he once 
showed apprehension of its dangers: see Lawrence and Victoria Summers, ‘When 
ﬁ  nancial markets work too well: a cautious case for a securities transaction tax’, 
Journal of Financial Services Research, 1989, no. 3, pp. 261–86. 44     nlr 3
equal to 18 percent of GDP—tripling in size over the previous 24 
months.31 This inﬂ  ow of foreign savings is, of course, the other 
side of the persistent American deﬁ  cit. Indeed, it is the continued 
willingness of foreigners to accept payment in dollars and to invest 
in dollar-denominated assets that alone has made it possible. Here 
the instability of stock markets across the rest of the world has been 
critical in making American assets so attractive. Independently of 
the Wall Street bubble, foreign investors prefer US bonds as well as 
stocks not because returns on them as such are always highest, but 
because they are perceived as the best risk-adjusted choice. At the 
same time, the main source of the rise in foreign-owned assets in the 
US in 1998 was not an increase in net new holdings, but rather price 
increases in the value of foreign-held American assets relative to the 
prices of American-held foreign assets.
Overseas savings in US ﬁ  nancial markets have in turn increased 
total demand for US securities and thus, all else being equal, their 
price. The effect here has primarily been indirect, since the share 
of foreign ownership in total American stock market capitalization 
has held fairly constant throughout the 1990s, at around 8 percent. 
But, as Jane D’Arista argues, because increased foreign purchases 
of US bonds have pushed their prices up and yields down, they 
have encouraged domestic investors to switch into stocks. ‘US equity 
markets could not have risen so far so fast without the beneﬁ  t of sub-
stitution effects from large capital inﬂ  ows.’32
5.  Adept Federal Reserve policy. The Federal Reserve has been praised 
for allowing unemployment to fall well below the level that NAIRU 
hawks had said was prudent. But, as we have seen, Greenspan 
understood that job insecurity would inhibit American workers from 
pressing for wage demands even in tight labour markets, as they had 
done in the past. His real achievement during the Clinton presidency 
has lain elsewhere—in holding a balance between the need to keep 
ﬁ  nancial markets liquid enough to sustain the stock market, and 
to keep interest rates high enough to ensure a continued ﬂ  ow of 
31 See Jane D’Arista, ‘International Capital Flows and the US Capital Account’, 
Capital Flows Monitor, 6 December 1999.
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foreign savings into the US. Greenspan has certainly managed this 
well, even as the countervailing market pressures have mounted. 
Furthermore, had Greenspan and Rubin not conducted successful 
bail-out operations when the sequence of Mexican, East Asian and 
Long-Term Capital Management crises broke out, the US stock 
market would probably have dived as the cumulative effects of these 
shocks coursed through global ﬁ  nancial markets.33 By a ‘successful’ 
bail-out, I mean an operation that not only prevented an interactive 
debt deﬂ  ation, but also protected the wealth of US investors—since 
substantial losses would almost certainly have burst the US bubble.
conclusion
How does the record of Clintonomics sum up? It should be clear that 
even by the lax standards of European ideologues friendly to Clinton, 
the claim that his Administration has pioneered a ‘Third Way’ which 
renews the best traditions of social liberalism is risible. This is not to 
say that Clinton’s policies have been indistinguishable from those of 
Bush or Reagan. The general requirement of product differentiation in 
an electoral market means that at the margin any Democratic President 
will offer more social concessions than a Republican opponent of the 
same cohort. A political system with a spectrum of opinion so narrow 
it deters half the electorate from voting depends on the persistence of a 
faint distinction between the two parties for its legitimacy. But it is the 
system, not its components, that tracks changes in direction of policy. 
Viewed historically, as the centre of gravity of the system has shifted 
steadily to the right over the past generation, a Republican incumbent 
of one period can easily be less reactionary than a Democrat in the next, 
as we have repeatedly seen from the data—Nixon presiding over higher 
wages and less poverty than Clinton. These structural coordinates set 
the parameters of American politics. But they do not absolve Presidents 
from responsibility for their time in ofﬁ  ce. As Clinton’s incumbency 
33 In saying ‘probably’, as opposed to ‘certainly’, I am acknowledging the counter-
vailing possibility that worsening conditions in overseas markets might have driven 
foreign investment in the US upwards. But it is still difﬁ  cult to imagine that a 
full-scale bankruptcy of Long-Term Capital Management would not have burst the 
bubble of ‘irrational exuberance’ in America.46     nlr 3
draws to a close, there has been a sustained effort by liberal media to 
burnish his tarnished credentials as a leader, with solemn eulogies of 
his record in ofﬁ  ce. The reality is far from these rosy images. The core 
of Clinton’s programme has been global economic integration, with 
minimum interventions to promote equity in labour markets or stabil-
ity in ﬁ  nancial markets. Gestures to the least well-off have been slight 
and back-handed, while wages for the majority have either stagnated 
or declined. Wealth at the top, meanwhile, has exploded. But a strat-
ospheric rise in stock prices and debt-ﬁ  nanced consumption spree make 
a mortgaged legacy. Clinton will hand over to his successor the most 
precarious ﬁ  nancial pyramid of the post-war epoch.